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Riggs: The Existence of Civil Rights at Common Law

THE EXISTENCK OF CIVIL EIGHTS AT COMMON LAW
Much is said and heard on the subject of civil rights and their infringement and deprivation. The subject has presented the courts
with many intricate problems, but thus far no rules have been formulated which make results certain in indiyidual cases. Although much
has been said on the subject, certain questions and problems still
exist. What are civil rights as compared to other rights? Do civil
rights exist or are they created? The purpose of this note is to discuss these and related topics.
"Civil rights." which are. said to be absolute rights,1 are, in the
broader sense of the term, those rights which are the outgrowth of
civilization. They arise from the needs of civilized, highly-organized
communities as distinguished from barbaric ones. They are given,
defined, and circumscribed by positive laws enacted by communities
as may be or are considered necessary to maintain organized government and still grant certain elements of individual freedom. They
comprehend all rights which civilized communities undertake to protect.2
"Civil rights" have been defined as those which have no relation
to the establishment, support, or management of government. 3 They
are also said to be those rights which are accorded to every member
of a distinct community or nation 4 which the municipal law will enforce at the instance of private individuals for the purpose of securing to them the enjoyment of their means of happiness.5 They have
been further defined as the rights of a citizen, the rights of an indi6
vidual as an individual, the duties due from one citizen to another,
and a privilege accorded to an individual by such duties due from
one to another which, if trespassed upon, may be redressed by a civil
7
action.
1. People v. Washington, 36 Cal. 658, 662 (1869).
2. Byers v. Sun Savings Bank, 41 Okla. 728, 139 P. 948, 52 L. R. A. (N. S.)
320 (1914); Grooms v. Thomas, 93 Okla. 87, 219 P. 700, 701 (1923).
3. People v. Barrett, 203 Ill. 99, 67 N. E. 742, 96 Am. St. Rep. 296 (1903);
Litzelman v. Town of Fox, 285 Ill. App. 7, 1 N. E. 2d 915, 917 (1935) ; People
v. Washington, supra.
4. Winnett v. Adams, 71 Neb. 817, 99 N. W. 681 (1904) ; Blackman v. Stone,
17 F. Supp. 102, 105 (S.D. Ill. 1936); Litzelman v. Town of Fox, supra.
5. Wilson v. Gonzales, 44 N. M. 599, 106 P. 2d 1093, 1095 (1940); State
v. Powers, 51 N. J. L. 432, 17 A. 969 (1889).
6. State of Iowa v. Chicago, B., and Q. Railway, 37 F. 497, 3 L. R. A. 554
(S. D. Iowa 1889) ; Commonwealth v. Shimpeno, 160 Pa. Super. 104, 50 A. 2d
39,43 (1946).
7. United States v. 24 Live Silver Black Foxes, 1 F. 2d 934 (D. C. Wash.
1924).
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In'discussing rights, one should note the distinction between a civil
right and a political right and between a civil right and a natural or
inherent right; these are closely connected and somewhat interrelated;
consequently some confusion has existed in attempting to differentiate them. The general distinction between a civil and a political
right is that a civil right is one accorded to every individual of a
distinct community or nation, having no relation to the establishment, support, or management of the government,8 while a political
right consists in the power to participate directly or indirectly in the
establishment or administration of the government.9 This participation in the government is said to have its extent and limits fixed
by constitutions ;1o it generally includes the right to participate in
12
the administration of justice," the right to vote for public officers,
the right to be a candidate for public office, the right to hold public
office, 1 3 and the right to citizenship. 14 Each individual in a given
locality is a beneficiary to all civil rights existing there and he continues to enjoy such rights unless "civil death" takes them from
him ;15 this is not true of political rights, since political rights extend
to citizens only. Therefore an alien would be entitled to all the civil
rights which exist in a community but would have no political rights
therein.18
While civil rights refer to the enjoyment of such non-political
guaranties as are contained in the constitutions or statutes, natural
or inherent rights are considered to exist regardless of municipal or
17
other laws on which civil rights always depend for enforcement. '
Natural rights are considered to be rights due any person from a government based generally on the idea of a God-given law. Even though
natural rights would exist if there were no municipal law, some natural
8. Joughin v. Parks, 107 Fla. 833, 147 So. 273 (1933).
9. Friendly v. Olcott, 61 Ore. 580, 123 P. 53 (1912) ; State ex rel. McGovren
v. Gilkison, ..... Ind. ......, 196 N. E. 231 (1935).

10. Winnett v. Adams, 71 Neb. 817, 99 N. W. 681 (1904); Blackman v.
Stone, 17 F. Supp. 102 (S. D. Ill. 1936); Caven v. Clark, 78 F. Supp. 295
(W. D. Ark. 1948).
11. State v. Powers, note 5 .rupra.
12. State v. Collins, 69 Wash. 268, 124 P. 903 (1912) ; Garrett v. Cunninghame, 211 Ala. 430, 100 So. 845 (1924) ; Pirtle v. Brown, 118 F. 2d 218 (6th
Cir. 1941). However, one decision, State ex rel. Parker v. Corcoran, 155 Kan.
714, 128 P. 2d 999 (1942), held that the term "civil rights," as used in statute
creating a housing project and providing that persons acquiring realty for that
project shall not impair the civil rights of inhabitants under the state or local
laws, was broad enough to include political rights such as the right to vote.
13. Herken v.Glynn, 151 Kan. 885, 101 P. 2d 946 (1940).
14. Friendly v. Olcott, note 9 supra.
15. See note 37 infra.
16. 1 Blackstone's Commentaries 124-139.

17. Sult v. Gilbert, 148 Fla. 31, 3 So. 2d 729, 731 (1941).
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rights are said to be abrogated by the municipal law, others are outside of its scope, and still others are enforceable under it as "civil
rights."' 8 The integration of these various rights makes the distinctions among them at times difficult to maintain, but, using as a
test the basis of their existence, the difference among them is dear.
Civil rights, varying because of the laws of the community in
which one lives and of which one is a member, 19 have been held to
include the liberty of the person and of his conscience20 and the
right to acquire, possess, and enjoy property ;21 however, the "opportunity" to acquire interest in real property has been held not to be a
civil right.2 The right of exercising the paternal and marital powers
and similar familial relations are generally considered civil rights.23
It is also recognized that the statutory right to sue the state for tortious acts of its officers and employees is a civil right. 24 The permission to operate a motor vehicle upon the highways of a state,
however, is not a civil right and the license to do so is thereby subject to conditions prescribed by the state.2 5
Because of the many apparent failures to support what have been
considered property rights, there is a question whether property
rights are civil rights. While having their origin in the common law,
certain property rights are considered protected by the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments. Variation in interpretation of what encompasses these constitutionally protected property rights has caused
much doubt as to which are now civil rights. Certain courts have,
however, used the terms synonomously, and clearly indicated that a
property right is also a civil right.2 6 This has been particularly
the case where equity jurisdiction has been sought.2 7 Property rights
include many varying rights which are an interest in, or incident to,
18. Wilson v. Gonzales, 44 N. M. 599, 106 P. 2d 1093, 1095 (1940) ; State v.
Powers, 51 N. I. L. 432, 17 A. 969 (1889).
19. Bowles v. Haberman, 95 N. Y. 246, 247 (1884).
20. Wilson v. Gonzales, note 18 supra.
21. People v. Washington, note 1 mtpra; Wilson v. Gonzales, note 18 supra.
22. Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corporation, 299 N. Y. 512, 87 N. E. 2d 541,
14 A. L. R. 2d 133, cert. denied 339 U. S. 981 (1949).
23. Litzelnian v. Town of Fox, note 3 supra; Caven v. Clark, 78 F. Supp.
295, 298 (W. D. Ark. 1948).
24. Application of White, 2 N. Y. S. 2d 582, 166 Misc. 481 (1938).
25. Commonwealth v. Funk, 323 Pa. 390, 186 A. 65, 67 (1936).
26. Anthony v. Burrow, 129 F. 783, 789 (C. C. Kan. 1903), quoting from
Ex parte Sawyer, 124 U. S.200, 31 L.Ed. 402 (1888).
27. W. Walley, Incorporated v. Saks and Company, 41 N. Y. S. 2d 739, 744,
266 App. Div. 193 (1943), and International News Service v. Associated Press,
248 U. S.215, 63 L. Ed. 211, 39 S.Ct. 68, 2 A. L. R. 293 (1918), stated that
"the rule that a court of equity concerns itself only in the protection of property rights treats any civil rights of a pecuniary nature as a property right."
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29
ownership of property, 28 including the right to conduct a business
80
The right to contract is also
and the right to make a contract.
considered a civil right and will be enforced as such,8 ' indicating
that some property rights are clearly civil rights.
Civil rights have also been considered to include the right of every
citizen to seek redress of wrongs and enforcement of rights in the
courts. As an incident to these is included the right of a person to
testify in his own behalf in a criminal case. 32 Even though the exact
derivation of the right to trial by jury is uncertain, that principle has
been stated as a "fundamental principle of civil rights." 33 The use
of court process 34 and the right to sue another are said by some
courts to be civil rights.35 Though bringing a suit is a civil right, the
basis being the injury of a legal right to the complainant, the filing of
notice of intention to file suit has been held not to be an exercise
of one's civil rights, since it is only a condition precedent to the suit.
Therefore one who has no civil rights may file such notice even
though he cannot bring the suit.8 6
Where a person has a civil right, it will be lost by conviction of a
felony, which imposes a "civil death"8 7 on the person. "Civil death"
is the deprivation of all rights whose existence or enjoyment depend
on some provision of positive law and, therefore, it includes the extinction of civil rights.8 8 This "civil death" is imposed by statute in
several states ;39 it is also said to exist at common law and only af-

28. For the various rights considered as property rights, see 34 Words and
Phrases, Property Rights, 553 et. seq.
29. Lauf v. E. G. Shinner & Co., 82 F. 2d 68, 72 (7th Cir. 1936) ; Freeman
v. Board of Adjustment of City of Great Falls, 97 Mont. 342, 34 P. 2d 534,
538 (1934).
30. Chicago Title and Trust Company v. Robin, 361 Ill. 261, 198 N. E. 4
(1935) ; State v. Whitaker ......... N. C.......... 45 S. E. 2d 860, 874 (1947). In
Coleman v. Whisnant, 225 N. C. 494, 35 S. E. 2d 647 (1945), the right to
contract was said to be a liberty as well as a property right.
31. Sult v. Gilbert, 148 Fla. 31, 3 So. 2d 729 (1941).
32. State v. Powers, note 5 supra.
33. People ex rel. Barrett v. Fritz, 316 Ill. App. 217, 45 N. E. 2d 48, 55

(1942).
34. Nastasi v. State, 61 N. Y. S. 2d 438, 441, 186 Misc. 1051 (1946).
35. Lipzchultz v. State, 78 N. Y. S. 2d 731 (1948).
36. Federman v. State, 19 N. Y. S. 2d 325, 173 Misc. 830 (1940).

37. Sullivan v. Prudential Insurance Company, 131 Me. 228, 160 A. 777
(1932). The court in this case appropriately defined "civil death" in stating
it to be "the state of one who, although possessing natural life, is, on account
of the commission of crime for which he has been convicted, incarcerated in
execution of sentence for so long as he shall live, and thereby loses all civil
rights; he is considered in law, dead."
38. In r Donnelly's Estate, 125 Cal. 417, 58 P. 61, 73 Am. St. Rep. 62
(1899); Holmes v. King, 216 Ala. 412, 113 So. 274 (1927).
39. In re Donnelly's Estate, supra; Holmes v. King, supra.
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firmed or modified by the statutes. 40 This death of one's rights as a
general rule is strictly enforced and followed in the courts. A statute
waiving the state's immunity from liability for the torts of its officers
and employees is held not to relieve a convicted felon from the statutory suspension of his civil rights so as to allow him to bring such a
suit during the term of his sentence. 41 It appears, however, that a
person in such a case may get statutory relief; a statute providing that
sentence forfeits all civil rights has been held not to preclude a recovery by a convict for injuries sustained during a previous imprisonment where the legislature had enacted an enabling act granting him
the right to sue.4 The court which allowed th6 convict to recover
based its holding on the theory that the right granted was not a civil
right; nevertheless the effect was to allow a person's civil rights to
be revived by legislative action when the person is "civilly dead" and
has no rights. But unless there is some specific enabling act involved,
there is no relief. Thus where a mortgagor was imprisoned and foreclosure was had by reason of default during his imprisonment, and
the sheriff delivered a deed, the mortgagor was not entitled to the
right to give notice and redeem it upon leaving prison after the period
for redemption has run out, since the right of redemption is a civil
right.43 The sentence of imprisonment was a suspension of all civil
rights of the person imprisoned for the duration of the term.4 4 A
civil right cannot be exercised after the period for its exercise has
passed, even though the person's rights were suspended during the
time when that same right was in existence.
In determining whether civil rights exist at common law or only
in statutory form, one can find some aid by observing the construction given to civil rights statutes by federal and state courts, and to
their statements and decisions. Emphasis, of course, is on the decisions of state courts since they are the primary interpreters of the
common law and thus of any civil rights which might exist under
such law. The civil rights which the federal courts will enforce in
favor of the individual and protect against violation by states or other
individuals are those which are secured by the Constitution and the
amendments thereto. All enabling acts Congress has passed to pro40. Breed v. Atlanta, Birmingham, and Coast Railroad Company, 241 Ala.
640, 4 So. 2d 315 (1941).

41. Green v. State, 295 N. Y. Supp. 672, 251 App. Div. 108 (1937).
42. Tomaselli v. State, 6 N. Y. S. 2d 435, 168 Misc. 674 (1938).
43. Grasser v. Jones, 102 Ore. 214, 201 P. 1069, 1090 (1921).
44. Wilson v. Gonzales, 44 N. M. 599, 106 P. 2d 1093 (1940); Tomaselli

v. State, note 42 supra.
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tect or enforce such rights are based on the Constitution. 45 This is
the limitation of federal government's authority in this field. As
stated by the Supreme Court, the federal government, although supreme and beyond the state in the scope of its power, can neither
grant nor secure to its citizens rights or privileges which are not
expressly or by implication placed under its jurisdiction. 46
The language of various decisions of the United States Supreme
Court indicates that the civil rights derived from the Constitution
are the only ones enforceable as federal rights. That Court has
stated that federal statutes protecting civil rights must not go beyond the authority given to the federal government by the Co stitution; other rights are left exclusively to the protection of the st tes.47
Certain provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 187548 were held unconstitutional as attempting to regulate action other than that of the
various arms of-the-state governments. 49 An act which attempted to
punish a conspiracy to deprive a person of the equal protection of
the laws was held to be unconstitutional on the grounds that it was
not limited to protect those rights secured by the Constitution.5 0
The Supreme Court has put another limitation upon what rights
will be federally protected against state action. Only the fundamental rights of the first ten Amendments are secured against state
action by the Fourteenth Amendment, i. e., only those rights which
are of the "very essence of a scheme or ordered liberty." 5 1 Here
again, the Court has used words without a definite meaning, leaving
the question of determining just what is meant by a "fundamental
right" or a right which is of "the very essence of a scheme or ordered
liberty" to be decided on the facts as each case comes before it, or
before lower federal and state courts.
Even though the federal courts have strictly construed the civil
rights acts, these acts do give protection to a person's enjoyment of
various rights or privileges secured to him by the Constitution, and
45. United States v. Reese, 92 U. S.214, 23 L. Ed. 563 (1875); United
InLawless v. Duval
County, 6 F. Supp. 303 (D.C. Fla. 1934), the court stated that suits to reStates v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542, 23 L. Ed. 588 (1875).

dress the deprivation of civil rights refers to action brought to protect those

civil rights "primarily, if not exclusively, secured by the Fourteenth Amendment."
46. Ibid.
47. United States v. Cruikshank, note 45 supra; Simpson v. Geary, 204 F. 507,
511 (D. C,Ariz. 1913).
48. Act March 1, 1875, c. 114, 18 Stat. 335, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901 p. 1259,
1 Fed. Stat. Ann. 805.
49. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S.3,27 L. Ed. 835 (1883).
50. United States v. Harris, 106 U. S.290, 27 L. Ed. 290 (1882).
51. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S.319, 82 L. Ed. 288 (1937).
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those provisions have been upheld as constitutional.052 It is considered that these statutes substantially re-enact and make effective
the constitutional amendment from which such rights are secured
in favor of individuals.5 3
State civil rights statutes providing for equal protection and accommodations in public places have been strictly construed by the
state courts.5 4 The statutes are similar to the federal acts usually.
The reasons given for such construction are that the statutes are
penal in character 55 and that they are in "derogation to, the common
law.15 6
The Iowa Supreme Court, in an action based on a civil rights
statute which provided that "all persons shall be entitled to full and
equal enjoyment of the accommodations in inns, restaurants . . .
and all other places where refreshments are served," held that such
statute did not apply to a purely private place where a merchant
gave away refreshments for advertising purposes. 57 In reaching its
decision, the court stated that "the question is purely one of statutory
construction, and it is not for the courts to extend the remedy or to
give the language used in the act an interpretation which it will not
reasonably bear. There is no such offense known to the common
law, and the liability and remedy are both creatures of the statute."5 8
The New York Court of Appeals, in construing a similar civil rights
statute, providing that there must be "equal accommodation to all
persons in inns, restaurants, hotels . . . and all other places of
public accommodation," held that such statute has no application to
a bootblacking stand. The court strictly construed the words "and
all other places of public accommodation" to not include bootblacking stands, since other places were statutorily enumerated and "the
legislature seems to have had no difficulty in naming a variety of
places and callings that have never been regarded as places of public
accommodation under the common law." 59
Another reason for the strict construction given to civil rights

52. Ex Parte Yarbrough, 110 U. S. 651, 28 L. Ed. 274 (1883) ; United States

v. Mosely, 238 U..S. 383, 59 L. Ed. 1355 (1915).
53. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303, 25 L. Ed.
54. People v. Barlett, 169 Ill. App. 304 (1912); Grace
App. 100 (1904); Brown v. J. H. Bell Company, 146 Iowa
27 L. R. A. (N. S.) 407 (1909).
55. Brown v. Meyer Sanitary Milk Company, 150 Kan.

(1939).

664 (1879).
v. Mosely, 112 Ill.
89, 123 N. W. 231,
931, 96- P. 2d 651

56. Grace v. Moseley, note 54 supra. Brown v. J. H. Bell Company, supra,
also stated that such statutes create "an offense unknown to the common law."
57. Brown v. J. H. Bell Company, note 54 supra.
58. 123 N. W. at 233.
59. Burks v. Bosso, 180 N. Y. 341, 73 N. E. 58, 105 Am. St. Rep. 762 (1905).
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statutes is that very often one person's common law right would be
restricted in the enforcement of the civil rights a person claims under
a statute. This was pointed out in a New York decision which held
that except as restricted by the civil rights act, the rights of proprie60
tors managing their theaters were those existing at common law.
At common law a business proprietor can discriminate as to those
who desire accommodation, choosing with whom he will do business.
The reasoning is that a person has an absolute right to operate his
business in any manner he wishes; therefore those coming into his
establishment must recognize these rights. Where a person was refused entrance to a theater, another New York decision stated that,
in order for him to sustain a judgment recovered under the civil
rights law, he "must show that the common law rule has been abrogated, either by constitutional provision or a legislative enactment not
violative of the Constitution." 6' 1 As to restriction by civil rights
laws of the common law right of a proprietor to manage his business, it appears clear that "a mere common law regulation of trade
'62
or business may be changed by statute."
As pointed out earlier, the courts have stated, in defining the term
"civil rights," that such rights are those of positive law,63 thereby indicating the non-existence of them at common law. In- pointing out
the distinction between civil rights and natural rights, it was said
civil rights were those which refer to the enjoyment of guaranties
existing in the Constitution and statutes. 64 Thus it is apparent from
these and other statements that the courts consider civil rights do not
60. Woollcott v. Shubert, 217 N. Y. 212, 111 N. E. 829, 830, L. R. A. 1916
E, 248, Ann. Cas., 1916 B, 726 (1916). The court further stated that "under

the common law, the rights of the plaintiff were not violated by the acts of
the defendants" where the plaintiff was refused admittance to the defendant's
theater. The statute here prohibited exclusion on grounds of race, creed, or
color; the court held this. could not be construed as to prohibit the exclusion
for any other reason, as in this case where the plaintiff was excluded because
of the animosity of the owner of the theater, engendered by adverse criticism.
61. Christie v. 46th Street Theatre Corporation, 39 N. Y. S. 2d 454, 265
App. Div. 255 (1942), aff'd., 292 N.'Y. 520, 54 N. E. 2d 206 (1944), cert. denied,
323 U. S. 710, 89 L. Ed. 571 (1944).
62. Munn v. State of Illinois, 94 U. S.113, 25 L. Ed. 77 (187&). Here the
court made the further statement that "a person has no property, nor vested,
interest in any rule of the common law .... Rights of property which have

been created by the common law cannot be taken away without due process;
but the law itself, as a rule of conduct, may be changed by the will, or even
the whim, of the legislature, unless prevented by constitutional limitations."
63. Byers v. Sun Savings Bank, note 2 supra; Groom v. Thomas, note 2 supra.
64. Sult v. Gilbert, note 31 supra; Wilson v. Gonzales, note 44 supra; State
v. Powers, note 5, supra; also In re Donnelly's Estate, 125 Cal. 417, 58 P. 61,
73 Am. St. Rep. 62 (1899), where the court stated, "Civil death imports a
deprivation of all rights whose exercise or enjoyment depends upon some provision of positive law. It is the extinction of civil rights."
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exist at common law but only in constitutional and statutory form.
This conclusion would be further substantiated by taking note of the
construction given the various civil rights statutes, especially those
enacted by state legislatures. The federal courts have strictly construed the federal civil rights statutes, but this is primarily because
the national government is one of enumerated powers and, consequently all rights enforced under its power must be derived from
the Constitution. The state courts are not bound by any such limitation within their jurisdiction, and their decisions provide better
guidance in answering these questipns.
In the state decisions, it is indicated strongly that one who seeks
to enforce a civil right must show that the right exists in statutory
form, although the courts have not stated this as a definite rule of
law. The general proposition has been that, to deprive a person
of a common law right, such as the right to conduct a business or
use one's property as one pleases, the person claiming discrimination
must point to a statute expressly covering the situation. By this and
other reasoning of the courts as indicated, it is clear that the courts
treat civil rights as having no existence in the common law but as
owing their existence to the pertinent constitutions or to statutes enacted by the various legislative bodies under constitutional authority.
MARioN
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